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Abstract This paper argues that we should replace the common classification of
theories of welfare into the categories of hedonism, desire theories, and objective
list theories. The tripartite classification is objectionable because it is unduly narrow
and it is confusing: it excludes theories of welfare that are worthy of discussion, and
it obscures important distinctions. In its place, the paper proposes two independent
classifications corresponding to a distinction emphasised by Roger Crisp: a four-
category classification of enumerative theories (about which items constitute wel-
fare), and a four-category classification of explanatory theories (about why these
items constitute welfare).
Keywords Welfare  Typology  Explanatory question  Enumerative question
Making progress in the philosophy of welfare is extremely hard, and we should not
place unnecessary obstacles in the way. In this paper, I claim that the standard
tripartite classification of theories of welfare—into hedonist theories, desire
theories, and objective list theories—is just such an obstacle. This classification
encourages confusion and narrow-mindedness. I propose a different classification
that does not suffer these faults. I do not claim that, if only philosophers adopted this
alternative, we would make much more progress. But I do claim that the traditional
classification is a needless obstacle to progress. Replacing it will not do any harm,
and may well do some good.
There are several different things one might call a ‘theory of welfare’. One such
thing is a theory about the relationship between the concept of welfare and other
important concepts, such as reason or goodness. Though this is an important kind of
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theory about welfare, it is not the sort of theory at issue here. For the purposes of
this paper, I will assume a standard view about the relationship between welfare and
other ethical concepts, which is that the concept of subject S’s welfare is the concept
of what is non-instrumentally good for S (Crisp 2006, p. 100; Feldman 2004,
pp. 8–14; cf. Darwall 2002). The ‘theories of welfare’ under discussion in this paper
are different views about which things are non-instrumentally good for someone,
and why. Hedonism, desire theories, and objective list theories are usually
understood as candidate answers to these questions. For simplicity, I will refer to
any philosophical claim, position, or view about these matters, no matter how well
developed, as a ‘theory of welfare’. I will not be concerned with the truth of any
theory of welfare, but only with how to classify them in a helpful way.
My thesis is that philosophical discussion of welfare is likely to be hindered
rather than served by the tripartite classification. In Sect. 1 I shall explain what I
think is wrong with it, and in Sects. 2 and 3 I shall propose a new way to classify
theories of welfare.
My central claims are modest and non-comparative. One way of proceeding
would be first to establish the theoretical values that we should use to evaluate
classificatory schemes in general, and then to claim that we should reject the
tripartite classification because it is less good, in these respects, than the new
classification proposed here. But the first part of this method is extremely ambitious,
and I do not attempt it. Instead I make two simpler claims in succession. First I
claim that the tripartite scheme has two faults that I assume are clear disqualifiers of
possible classificatory schemes: it is unduly narrow and it obscures important
distinctions. These faults make it an obstacle to progress in this area, and provide a
non-comparative reason for rejecting it. I then propose a different way of classifying
theories of welfare. Whatever its merits all things considered, this classification does
not have the defects of the tripartite scheme. So it is at least not disqualified on those
grounds.
1 The tripartite classification
The tripartite classification is common but not universal in contemporary
philosophical discussions of welfare. For example, it is used in Parfit’s, Kagan’s,
and Crisp’s influential discussions (Parfit 1987, pp. 493–502; Kagan 1998,
pp. 29–41; Crisp 2006, p. 98; 2008; see also Scanlon 1998, p. 113; Sumner 1996,
Chaps. 3–5). Some other commentators adapt the tripartite classification, adding
further categories. Thus, for example, Haybron distinguishes the following main
philosophical views about welfare: hedonism; desire theories; list theories; authentic
happiness theories; and nature-fulfilment theories (2008, pp. 33–36).1
It is possible to utilise the tripartite classification, or some cousin of it, whilst
holding any of a wide range of different background views about its usefulness,
exhaustiveness, and so on. So I should be clear that, in criticising the tripartite
1 I have listed Haybron’s categories in a different order than he does. See also Feldman (2004,
pp. 15–20), Heathwood (2010), Carson (2000).
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classification, I do not take myself to be criticising any of these authors. Many or all
of them may have similar, or more stringent, misgivings about it.2 I mean only to
claim that the classification itself is unsatisfactory, and then to propose a different
way of classifying theories of welfare that does not suffer the same problems.
Arguing about the merits of one or other typology obviously raises the issue of
what we should take to be the virtues or vices of typologies of philosophical views
or theories. No doubt there is room for substantive philosophical disagreement about
this. It would be an interesting and important exercise to try to clarify the
considerations favouring one or other method of classifying philosophical views in
general. But I do not attempt this ambitious exercise here. Instead, I merely assume
that the following two features are together sufficient to disqualify a possible
classificatory scheme. First, the scheme is unduly narrow, in the sense that it
encourages us to overlook views about the issue in question that are worthy of
discussion. Second, the scheme is confusing, in the sense that it encourages us to
conflate distinct issues. I take it that these are serious faults. It is hard to see why one
should accept a classificatory scheme that suffers from just one of them; but in any
case I assume that we should not accept any scheme that suffers from both. I shall
now claim that the tripartite classification of theories of welfare does suffer from
both of these defects.
Consider the first point. An initial criticism of the tripartite classification might
be that it excludes interesting views such as those that Haybron adds to his list. For
example, Sumner’s view that welfare consists in authentic happiness does not seem
to fit any of the three categories, yet seems very interesting and worthy of
discussion. Authentic happiness, as Sumner defines it, cannot properly be
assimilated either to any form of pleasure or to any form of desire-satisfaction.
Yet it seems strained to place Sumner’s view into the category of objective list
theories, since he is at pains to criticise objective theories of welfare (1996, Chaps.
2–3).
This seems to be a fair criticism. Supposing that this classification is meant to be
exhaustive, we must either find a place for Sumner’s view in one of the three
categories, or deny that it is interesting or otherwise worthy of inclusion, or amend
the tripartite classification. Neither of the first two options is very appealing. The
same goes for other theories apparently excluded by the tripartite classification. For
example, consider welfare nihilism. According to this view, there are no constituents
of welfare, since nothing is non-instrumentally good for anyone. This seems to be a
coherent view, and certainly it is worthy of discussion. So Haybron seems right to
modify the tripartite classification, adding further categories to allow for other
views, including Sumner’s.
Defenders of the tripartite classification might make a number of objections at
this point. They might, first, deny that the classification is supposed to apply to all
worthwhile philosophical theories of welfare. This may well be true of many
particular uses of the classification, but it is not a powerful defence of the
classification itself. The fact that one can make some use of a non-exhaustive
typology hardly goes to show that we should not prefer typologies to be exhaustive.
2 Crisp (2008) expresses some doubts about it, for example.
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Nor is it particular hard for a typology to be exhaustive: it just has to have an
appropriately defined residual category.
A second possible objection would be to claim that the tripartite classification
contains just such a residual category: the category of ‘objective list theories’. This
response has some plausibility. The category of objective list theories can be treated
to some extent as a residual category, containing views that perhaps share little in
common other than not being versions of hedonism or the desire theory. For
example, for some purposes one might want to classify welfare nihilism as a
limiting case of an objective list theory, in which the list contains no items. One
might assume at first that this should not be thought an ‘objective’ list theory: there
would be no items, therefore no objective items, on the list; and the theory would
not be committed to the existence of objective values. But there is perhaps a sense in
which welfare nihilism is an objective theory: it claims that the truth about welfare
is independent of whatever people happen to care about or in any other way
subjectively endorse. Perhaps this is the sense of ‘objective’ that is supposed to
unite the members of the third category. Whether or not that is so, though, we
cannot really expect all of the interesting alternatives to hedonism and the desire
theory to be ‘objective’ theories in this sense.3 It seems unlikely that Sumner’s view,
for example, is objective in the way that is meant when theories of welfare are
called ‘objective list views’.
For these reasons it seems that the tripartite classification as it is cannot plausibly
claim to be exhaustive. One must either accept that it excludes some interesting
views, or make the significant change of dropping ‘objective’ from the specification
of the third category, thereby enabling it to be a proper residual category. We could
call theories of this third type ‘other list theories’, for example. This would indeed
be a significant change, since current uses of the tripartite classification sometimes
take this ‘objective’ to mark a significant defining feature of the category.4
So, the tripartite classification is unduly narrow. Still, one might think that a
fairly simple change is in order, and that a modified three-category typology of
theories of welfare would be exhaustive and would serve well. We might argue over
whether further subdivisions in the residual category would be helpful, but these
disputes seem to rely on judgement calls. It would not be obviously unreasonable to
prefer fewer to more categories in a typology of this sort once room has been found
for all of the interesting views.
However, we have another powerful reason for seeking a more radical change to
the tripartite classification. This is that it encourages us to conflate different issues.
In particular, it obscures two important distinctions.
First, it obscures the distinction between what Crisp has called the enumerative
and the explanatory questions about welfare (2006, pp. 102–103). The enumerative
question is this: what are the constituents of (some subject’s) welfare? Any answer
3 Perhaps this explains why Haybron (2008, pp. 34, 36) refers to ‘list views’ rather than ‘objective list
views’. However, any theory that answers the enumerative question (on which, see below) might be
called a ‘list view’.
4 For example, Kagan contrasts hedonism and desire theories with ‘objective theories’, which he defines
as ‘theories that hold that being well off is a matter of having certain goods in one’s life, goods that are
simply worth having, objectively speaking’ (1998, p. 39).
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to this question must be a list of some sort, so every enumerative theory of welfare is
a list theory. The explanatory question is different: in virtue of what is any given
item supposed to be a constituent of (some subject’s) welfare? Note that different
answers to this question might be proposed for any particular item enumerated. For
example, suppose we agree that pleasure is a constituent of welfare. In virtue of
what is it a constituent? One possible answer is that it is a constituent of welfare
because of its pleasurableness. But this explanation is not mandatory for every
enumerative hedonist. One could claim that pleasure is a constituent of welfare
because it satisfies the subject’s desires, or because it is objectively good, or because
Dionysus made it so, for example.
The standard tripartite classification makes it very hard to keep Crisp’s important
distinction clearly in view. Admittedly, the classification is not outright incompat-
ible with Crisp’s distinction. But if we keep Crisp’s distinction in mind, the tripartite
classification just looks baffling. Why contrast ‘hedonism’ (on the face of it, a
purely enumerative view) with ‘objective list theories’ (on the face of it, a category
defined in part or whole by an answer to the explanatory question)? Why think that,
if one’s answer to the enumerative question is not ‘pleasure’ or ‘satisfaction of
desires’ (or some combination thereof), one is thereby committed to an ‘objective’
answer to the explanatory question? Worse, why think that if one’s answer to the
enumerative question is ‘pleasure’ or ‘satisfaction of desires’ (or some combination
thereof), one is thereby committed to rejecting an ‘objective’ answer to the
explanatory question?
Even the modified tripartite classification, in which the third category is ‘other
list theories’, makes it hard to focus on the difference between explanatory and
enumerative issues. This is because it is not clear which of these questions desire
theories of welfare are supposed to answer. Recently, Guy Fletcher has argued that
desire theories must be understood as explanatory theories of welfare, not as
enumerative theories. They claim that the things that constitute Smith’s welfare—
namely, the things that satisfy her desires—do so because they satisfy her desires.
Adding an enumerative claim to the effect that the constituents of her welfare are
the things that satisfy her desires is redundant and uninformative (Fletcher,
forthcoming). If Fletcher is right, the modified tripartite classification cross-
classifies theories. It sorts theories into three categories, two of which (‘hedonism’
and ‘other list’) are defined by reference to the enumerative issue, and one of which
(‘desire theories’) is defined by reference to the explanatory issue.
Fletcher might be wrong that the desire theory cannot be understood as an
enumerative theory. Possibly one could think of some desire theories as enumerative
theories. ‘Whatever Smith desires’ is an economical (though admittedly not, by
itself, very informative) enumeration of the particular things that Smith desires. This
enumeration could be paired with a quite different explanatory theory, in which the
explanation of why these things constitute Smith’s welfare is, say, that Smith fulfils
her nature as an autonomous agent by having desires and satisfying them. The
explanatory theory could claim that fulfilling one’s nature as an autonomous agent is
objectively valuable in some way. Then we would have the combination of an
‘objective’ explanatory theory and a version of the desire theory as an enumerative
theory.
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However, Fletcher is surely right that it makes sense to think of many desire
theories as explanatory rather than enumerative. So, even if some desire theories are
enumerative, the tripartite classification still cross-classifies, and so makes it harder
to keep Crisp’s distinction in view.
What is more, the tripartite classification obscures another important distinction.
Consider the difference between hedonist and desire theories of welfare, where both
are understood as enumerative theories. What distinguishes them? One possible
answer is that the main difference between them is that one (hedonism) is a ‘mental
state’ view, since the items it enumerates are mental states, while the other (the
desire view) is a ‘world state’ view, since the items it enumerates are states of the
world (Griffin 1986, Chap. 1).
This is, no doubt, an important difference between most versions of these views.5
However, there may be other important differences. Though one view about the
nature of pleasure is that it is a mental state that is desired in some way, this is
controversial. It is a form of ‘externalism’, since it claims that what pleasures share
in common is some relation to a positive attitude of some kind. Other externalist
views are possible, according to which the relation is to some attitude other than
desire. ‘Internalist’ views are also possible, according to which pleasures are united
by the way they feel (Brandt 1979, pp. 40–41; Sumner 1996, pp. 87–94; Crisp 2006,
pp. 103–111; Feldman 1997). Our classification of theories of welfare ought not to
rule out any of these views. So, it should leave room for hedonist theories according
to which pleasure involves some positive attitude other than desire, and for hedonist
theories according to which pleasure involves a positive feeling of some kind. We
could think of these other attitudes, or the positive feeling, as possible kinds of
subjective endorsement.6 These possible kinds of subjective endorsement are
independent of desire. For simplicity, I will say that they are all examples of the idea
of liking something. To like something is to endorse it in some way that is
conceptually independent of desiring it.7
If that is right, we should not run together the following two possible distinctions
between hedonism and desire theories. One issue is whether a theory of welfare
enumerates mental states or world states (or both). A quite different issue is whether
it enumerates things the subject desires or things she likes. On the face of it, there
are at least four possible combinations of answers to these questions. In encouraging
us to run these two distinctions together the tripartite classification once again
hinders philosophical discussion of welfare.
5 But not all: Heathwood (2006) claims that the most plausible version of hedonism is identical to the
most plausible version of the desire view.
6 For this to be compatible with internalism about pleasure, we must allow that when something feels
good there is a sense in which the subject ‘endorses’ it—despite it not being the case that any other
attitude towards the feeling need be involved.
7 Crisp’s discussion of enjoyment postulates a kind of liking in the sense I have described. For example,
he writes, ‘It seems to me there can be enjoyment without desire. Imagine an ascetic who very strongly
wishes that the enjoyment he is experiencing from being near to someone sexually attractive to him would
stop. I fail to see why this must be construed as a case of conflict of desires’ (2006, p. 107 n. 38).
Haybron’s discussion of happiness as ‘psychic affirmation’ of one’s life is a different example of the
concept of desire-independent subjective endorsement (2008, Chap. 7).
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We should reject the tripartite classification even in its modified form. It is
unduly narrow, and it makes it hard to keep important distinctions clearly in view.
We should look for a way of classifying theories of welfare that does not have these
defects. In what follows I suggest one such way. It seeks to entrench Crisp’s
distinction through the inelegant but apparently inescapable method of proposing
two separate classifications: one for enumerative theories and one for explanatory
theories. It also seeks to highlight the possibility of non-standard and hybrid
theories. Other, better, typologies may well be possible. But the main point is that
we should not continue to labour under the unnecessary burdens imposed by the
tripartite classification.
2 A new typology of enumerative theories
First, then, consider the range of possible answers to the enumerative question. One
important answer, as we have already noted, is that nothing is non-instrumentally
good for anyone (which seems to imply that nothing is good for anyone, full stop).
Welfare nihilism is an interesting enumerative theory, and it is certainly worthy of
discussion. So it should be included in a satisfactory typology of enumerative
theories. But let us consider the non-nihilistic alternatives. One basic question is
whether there is any informative, true, general answer to the enumerative question.
We are all familiar with the fact that, when we specify concrete instrumental goods,
different things appear to be good for different people. Broccoli is good for some,
but bad for those who are allergic to it. We tend to assume that, when we specify
noninstrumental goods, we must simultaneously shift to more abstract specifica-
tions, such as ‘pleasure’ or ‘friendship’. We further tend to assume that, in giving
abstract specifications of noninstrumental goods, we will be able to answer the
enumerative question in a way that is informative, general, and true.
But these assumptions could be false. Why must noninstrumental goods be
specified in abstract terms? It could be that we assume they must because we tend to
run-together the enumerative and explanatory questions. That might explain why,
for example, we would be more inclined to suggest that ‘friendship’ is a candidate
constituent of welfare than that particular friendships are. Yet, on the face of it, it
seems more natural to say that particular friendships are good for me, than that
friendship is; and when we distinguish clearly between the enumerative and
explanatory tasks, we may be more inclined to specify concrete items rather than
abstract ones.8 Second, the tendency to specify the constituents of welfare in
abstract terms may obscure the possibility of welfare variabilism: the view that,
when specified informatively, the constituents of welfare are different for different
individuals (Fletcher 2008, Chap. 6; 2009).9 Those who would apply the concept of
welfare to non-human animals might well accept that the constituents of welfare for
8 Abstract enumerations may be more economical, however. Rather than saying that each of my
particular friendships is non-instrumentally good for me, we can say simply that friendship is.
9 Bailey (1997, p. 6) notes briefly that ‘[it] may… be the case that there are no goods that are identifiably
goods for all actually existing persons, and there may be goods that are goods for only one person’.
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members of one species are different from the constituents of welfare for members
of another. Should we assume that such variation could not occur within species? If
not, should we assume that it could not occur within the species Homo sapiens?
Perhaps it could not: but that seems a substantive thesis, and worth debating.
So we should leave room in a classification of enumerative theories for nihilism
and variabilism. How should we divide the class of invariabilist (and non-nihilist)
enumerative views? There are, no doubt, many ways of doing this. Some of these
will suit some purposes better than they suit others. For example, it might well be
worthwhile dividing enumerative views according to their metaphysical commit-
ments: in particular, the bearers of value they posit. Though that approach may be
worthwhile, I will propose something more familiar to ethical discussions. I propose
that we divide invariabilist theories according to whether they accept or reject two
independent theses, which I will call the experience requirement and the desire
requirement.
A theory accepts the experience requirement just in case it claims that, for any
subject S, the only constituents of S’s welfare are S’s experiences (Griffin 1986,
pp. 13, 16–19; Scanlon 1993, pp. 186–187; 1996, pp. 127–128).10 According to such
theories, if some fact about my life does not affect my experience it cannot affect
my welfare. Which experiences constitute welfare is of course a further matter, over
which theories accepting the experience requirement may differ. And, of course, an
enumerative theory may fail to endorse the experience requirement yet still include
certain experiences as constituents of welfare. So the class of theories that do not
impose the experience requirement is not the same as the class of theories that
altogether ignore experiences.
The second distinction is between those theories that do and those that do not
accept the desire requirement. A theory accepts the desire requirement just in case it
claims that, for any subject S, the only constituents of S’s welfare are satisfactions of
some set of desires that is appropriately related to S’s desires.11 This condition can
be interpreted in importantly different ways, according to how some key terms are
understood. First, we could understand ‘satisfaction of a desire’ in the standard way,
according to which S’s desire for X is satisfied if and only if X obtains. This has the
effect of making any theory that accepts the desire requirement (understood in this
way) a ‘world state theory’.12 Alternatively, we could understand ‘satisfaction of a
desire’ as subjective satisfaction, according to which S’s desire for X is satisfied if
and only if S believes that X obtains (Heathwood 2006, pp. 547–551). This has the
effect of making any theory that accepts the desire requirement (understood in this
way) a ‘mental state theory’ (Griffin 1986, pp. 7–8; Heathwood 2006, p. 550). Since
it is often thought that mental state theories are at a significant disadvantage due to
10 There are of course difficulties in specifying the experience requirement precisely, since it is not
straightforward to specify what is involved in something’s being an experience. Fortunately we can leave
these difficulties aside here.
11 We can generate different versions of the desire requirement by understanding ‘desire’ more or less
broadly. Broader versions include some pro-attitudes that are not ordinarily called ‘desires’, such as
wantings or endorsements. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for discussion of this point.
12 This assumes that the desire is for a state of the world to obtain. See Griffin (1986, pp. 7–17).
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Experience Machine worries, this is of course an important distinction (Nozick
1974, pp. 42–45).13
The second important term in the specification of the desire requirement concerns
the precise set of desires whose satisfaction is said to constitute welfare. My
formulation was: some set of desires that is appropriately related to the subject’s
desires. This clearly leaves room for a great variety of significantly different views.
The simplest view is the actual desire view, according to which the welfare of
subject S at time t is constituted by satisfaction of S’s actual desires at time t. But for
familiar reasons, those who propose desire theories typically do not adopt this view.
Instead they tend to claim that the relevant set of desires is related in some more
complex way to the subject’s actual desires. One important refinement is the
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic desires. To have an intrinsic desire for
something is to desire it for its own sake, whereas to have an extrinsic desire for
something is to desire it for the sake of something else (for example, as a means to
that thing). On the face of it, the satisfaction of intrinsic desires is what matters for
welfare (Feldman 2010, pp. 59–60; Heathwood 2006, pp. 540–541). Another
possible refinement seeks to adjust for poor information or understanding. More or
less expansive accounts of what counts as poverty of information or understanding
will then lead to markedly different forms of desire theory (Griffin 1986, pp. 10–17).
Third, the theory may discriminate among desires according to their subject matter.
One such possibility is to distinguish between ‘local’ and ‘global’ desires: global
desires are about part or all of one’s life considered as a whole, whereas local
desires are not (Parfit 1987, pp. 496–499). Another possibility is to seek to exclude
desires that seem to have little to do with the subject’s welfare. As Scanlon puts it,
‘a person can in principle have preferences about anything whatever—about the
number of moons the planet Uranus has, about the colour of Frank Sinatra’s eyes, or
about the sexual mores of people whom they will never see’ (Scanlon 1993,
p. 186).14 To answer such worries, desire theories may seek to exclude desires that
are not about the subject’s own life.
On most interpretations, the experience requirement is independent of the desire
requirement. If ‘satisfaction of desire’ is understood as subjective satisfaction, and
we assume that to believe that X obtains is to have a certain sort of experience, then
it follows that any theory of welfare that accepts the desire requirement must also
accept the experience requirement. Otherwise, the two requirements are indepen-
dent of each other.
We can imagine a kind of theory according to which the constituents of welfare
are a set of desired experiences, and we can contrast this with a second kind of
theory according to which the constituents of welfare are a set of experiences that
need not be desired. We can contrast both of these with a third kind of theory,
according to which the constituents of welfare must be desired but need not be
experienced, and a fourth theory according to which the constituents need not be
desired or experienced. In sum, the two requirements can be combined to yield the
possibilities shown in Table 1.
13 Heathwood (2006) and Crisp (2006) are notable recent attempts to defend mental state theories.
14 See also Parfit (1987, pp. 494–495); Griffin (1986, pp. 16–17, 21–23).
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Each of these four categories contains considerable internal diversity, only some
of which we have noted already in relation to the interpretation of each requirement.
For example, hedonist views occupy Cells 1 or 2, according to the theories of the
nature of pleasure they employ. Desire-based externalist theories of pleasure yield
forms of hedonism that accept both the desire and experience requirements, and so
fall in Cell 1. But these cells also contain views that, though focused on experiences,
are not hedonist. For example, welfare eudaimonism claims that welfare consists in
happiness, which may or may not consist in pleasurable experience.15
Note also that accepting the experience requirement by itself does not make a
theory a ‘mental state’ theory, if by that is meant a theory that treats all
phenomenologically indistinguishable mental states alike. Accepting the experience
requirement is, after all, compatible with accepting additional requirements.16 For
example, veridical hedonism claims that only veridical pleasures contribute to
welfare. For those attracted to hedonism but worried by Nozick’s Experience
Machine, it might be an appealing theory.17 (Whether veridical hedonism can be
supported by an appealing explanatory theory is a good question, though not a
typological one. The present point is that it is a possible form of hedonism, and that
affirming the experience requirement does not amount to endorsing pure mental-
statism.)
Standard forms of ‘desire theory’ occupy Cell 3, since they reject the experience
requirement. But we have already noted that these theories can differ greatly from
each other according to the precise set of desires they count as relevant. In addition,
we noted that interpreting ‘satisfaction’ as subjective satisfaction might produce a
view in Cell 1. A different way to produce a view in Cell 1 is to restrict the relevant
set of desires to those that concern the subject’s experiences. The constituents of
welfare would then be a set of desired experiences (this may be equivalent to some
forms of externalist hedonism). Further, two important kinds of hybrid view occupy
Cell 3. According to the first, two-way hybrid, welfare consists in getting things one
Table 1 Possible combinations
of the experience and desire
requirements
Accepts desire
requirement
Does not accept
desire requirement
Accepts experience
requirement
1 2
Does not accept experience
requirement
3 4
15 Sumner (1996, pp. 138–183) develops a theory of welfare as authentic happiness. Haybron (2008)
develops an ‘emotional state’ account of happiness, and argues that happiness is central to, though not
identical with, welfare. Scanlon (1993, p. 186) calls any theory that accepts the experience requirement
‘hedonism’, but this very broad usage is needlessly revisionist. I am grateful to Guy Fletcher for
discussion of this point.
16 One important example of such a theory is the idea that welfare consists of enjoying the good. See
Kagan (2009).
17 Veridical hedonism is of course a ‘mental state’ theory in the following different but important sense:
the items it enumerates are all mental states. But note that this is not the sense of ‘mental state theory’
according to which all such theories are subject to Experience Machine worries.
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desires and liking them. This view trades on the supposition mentioned in Sect. 1
above that ‘desiring’ and ‘liking’ involve two different kinds of subjective
endorsement. But though the two-way hybrid appeals to the ‘liking’ kind of
endorsement associated with some forms of hedonism, it claims that the constituents
of welfare are the things that satisfy desires (and which are liked), and so it does not
accept the experience requirement. Similarly, according to the three-way hybrid,
welfare consists in getting things of objective value that one desires and likes.18
Finally, Cell 4 of course contains enormous diversity. It is a residual class, and so
contains a very wide range of views. Views in this category may be monist or
pluralist, and they may of course include satisfaction of desire, or certain
experiences, or both, in their enumerations, but they nevertheless reject both
requirements. An important kind of hybrid, disjunctive hybrid views, fit into this
category. According to such views, an item must be an experience of a certain kind,
or the satisfaction of a desire (or, perhaps, something else, such as objectively
valuable), to be a constituent of welfare. Such hybrid views deny both the
experience and desire requirements, despite making central use of the concepts of
experience and desire (Hawkins 2010).
If we classify enumerative theories according to their endorsement or otherwise
of the two requirements I have discussed, we get the classification shown in Table 2
(the theories listed are for illustration: the lists are not supposed to be exhaustive).
There is a limited resemblance between this classification and the tripartite
classification discussed in Sect. 1. In particular, hedonist theories and desire theories
both feature in my proposed classification. For certain purposes, we might wish to
focus attention on these two kinds of theory, and perhaps we might wish to consider
them alongside a category featuring the views that fit the classification ‘objective
list theories’. We can still do this if we wish. But my classification has a number of
advantages over the tripartite classification. First, it raises the profile of other
possible enumerative views, such as the different kinds of hybrid view, variabilism,
or nihilism. It also classifies views strictly according to their answers to the
enumerative question, thus helping us to respect Crisp’s distinction. It does nothing
to obscure the possibility of distinguishing different kinds of subjective endorse-
ment. Finally, it encourages discussion of theses—in particular, the two require-
ments used to organise the views—rather than of traditions—such as ‘hedonism’ or
‘desire theory’.
3 A new typology of explanatory theories
Let us turn now to explanatory theories. These theories attempt to explain why some
particular enumerated items constitute (some subject’s) welfare. The most salient
distinction amongst possible explanatory theories is between ‘subjective’ and
‘objective’ theories. These terms are of course treacherous—especially here, where
meta-ethical, ethical, and political intuitions are apt to collide. One important point
18 A different kind of hybrid combines objective value with just one kind of subjective endorsement. For
example, see Heathwood (2010, p. 652).
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is that we should be careful not to slide back over Crisp’s distinction. A
philosophical theory of welfare could be ‘subjective’ in the sense that its answer to
the enumerative question lists some subjective feature of lives such as pleasurable
experiences, even though it endorses an objective answer to the explanatory
question. In the sense with which we will be concerned, though, the distinction
between subjective and objective theories applies only to different possible answers
to the explanatory question.
Sumner has a careful discussion of the appropriate sense of ‘subjective’ in
relation to welfare. He concludes that we should reserve the term ‘subjective’ for
those theories according to which nothing can constitute a person’s welfare unless
she has some appropriate positive attitude towards it. Any other theory he deems
‘objective’, so that the two categories are jointly exhaustive (Sumner 1996, p. 38).19
Though it is helpful, I think we should depart from Sumner’s way of drawing this
distinction in two respects. First, we should define the category of subjective
theories more narrowly. I assume that a large part of the interest in explanatory
subjectivism has to do with worries about the ontological and epistemological
commitments of objective theories of value. If so, Sumner’s category is certainly too
broad, since it includes hybrid explanatory theories according to which something
can be a final good for a person only if she has some appropriate positive attitude
towards it and it merits that attitude by being objectively valuable. Such views could
have commitments that most anti-objectivists would find extravagant. So Sumner’s
classification does not serve one of our main interests in distinguishing ‘subjective’
and ‘objective’ theories.
The problem is that Sumner makes the distinguishing feature of subjectivism the
idea merely that appropriate positive attitudes are necessary for something’s being a
constituent of welfare. As we have just seen, this is compatible with the idea that
objective value is also necessary for something’s being a constituent of welfare. We
could exclude that possibility by stipulating that a theory is subjective only if it claims
that appropriate positive attitudes are both necessary and sufficient for something’s
being a constituent of welfare. Sumner considers this, but rejects it on the grounds that
‘[j]ust as subjective analyses of colour are likely to regard it as the product of an
Table 2 Proposed classification of enumerative theories
Accepts desire requirement Does not accept desire requirement
Accepts
experience
requirement
Desire-based externalist forms of hedonism;
non-hedonist theories, such as some forms
of eudaimonism; subjective satisfaction
desire theories; welfare nihilisma
Internalist forms of hedonism; non-
hedonist theories, such as some
forms of eudaimonism
Does not accept
experience
requirement
Standard desire theories; two-way hybrid;
three-way hybrid
Other invariabilist theories, including
disjunctive hybrid theories; welfare
variabilism
a Strictly, welfare nihilists can accept both the experience and desire requirements. I am grateful to Carrie
Ichikawa Jenkins for this point
19 ‘Attitude’ is Sumner’s general term for any kind of valenced mental state, such as ‘wanting, or liking,
or enjoying, or approving’ (1996, p. 37).
798 C. Woodard
123
interaction between a perceiving subject and a perceived object, subjective analyses
of welfare are also likely to be relational or dispositional’ (1996, p. 38). I take it that
this means that we should allow for subjective theories, like standard forms of desire
theory, that account for welfare partly in terms of states of the external world (so that it
is possible to distinguish between cases in which someone’s desire is really satisfied
and cases in which she erroneously believes it to be satisfied).
Certainly it is important to allow that some subjective theories of welfare will
track this distinction or in other ways refer to states of the external world. The
‘world-involving’ nature of standard forms of desire theory is much emphasised in
the literature on welfare. And we should define explanatory subjectivism so that it is
compatible with desire theories. However, this does not speak against defining
subjective theories as those that answer the explanatory question by reference only
to the subject’s attitudes. To think otherwise is to confuse enumerative issues with
explanatory ones. The distinction between genuinely satisfied desires, and desires
erroneously believed to be satisfied, appears to fall on the enumerative side of
Crisp’s distinction. In the first place at least it is a matter of which things contribute
to welfare, not of what explains why these things contribute to welfare. One can
hold that genuine desire satisfaction contributes to welfare while mere subjective
satisfaction does not, yet still seek to explain why desire satisfaction contributes to
welfare entirely in terms of the subject’s attitudes.
Thus we should define a theory as subjective just in case it answers the
explanatory question entirely in terms of the subject’s attitudes. Such theories claim
that the subject’s attitudes alone explain why certain things are non-instrumentally
good for her. They can be combined with enumerative claims that refer to states of
the external world. But they cannot appeal to anything other than the subject’s
attitudes in answering the explanatory question. This is why hybrid theories—which
answer the explanatory question in terms of the subject’s attitudes but also refer to
objective values—do not count as subjective theories on my proposal.
The second departure from Sumner’s way of drawing the distinction is to treat
objective views as merely a subset of possible non-subjective views. Consider a
view according to which the answer to the explanatory question has to do
exclusively with facts about biological function.20 Such a view is not subjective,
since it does not answer the explanatory question in terms of the subject’s attitudes.
But it seems not to be objective either, at least if the point of distinguishing
subjective views from objective ones is largely to do with controversies about the
existence of objective values. The sort of view I have in mind makes no reference to
values. So I propose that we distinguish objective views from naturalist ones. A
theory is objective just in case it answers the explanatory question by appeal to
objective values, even if it appeals to other considerations as well. Thus, the hybrid
views I mentioned earlier are objective on this usage. A theory is naturalist just in
case it answers the explanatory question without appeal to objective values and not
entirely in terms of the subject’s attitudes.21 Theories that appeal to naturalist
20 Foot (2001) may be an example of this sort of view.
21 Of course it may be difficult to decide whether some particular consideration counts as an objective
value. I leave that issue aside here.
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considerations such as facts about biological function and also to objective values
are a second kind of hybrid. As with the other kind of hybrid, my classification
includes these amongst objective theories.
So far we have three categories of explanatory theory: subjective, objective, and
naturalist. We should add a fourth: no-answer theories, according to which there is
no true, general, and informative answer to the explanatory question. Scanlon seems
inclined to endorse such a view when he writes that the most plausible kind of
‘substantive good’ theory:
… claims that certain diverse goods make a life better, and it will be prepared
to defend this claim by offering reasons (possibly different in each case) about
why these things are desirable. But it may offer no unified account of what
makes things good. It seems to me unlikely that there is any such account to be
had, since it is unlikely that there are any good-making properties which are
common to all good things. If this is correct, then there will be no general
theory of goodness in between, on the one hand, a purely formal analysis of
‘good’ such as ‘answers to certain interests’ or ‘has the properties it is rational
to want in a thing of that kind’ and, on the other hand, diverse arguments about
why various properties of particular objects make those objects good. (Scanlon
1993, p. 191; see also Scanlon 1998, pp. 125–126.)
No-answer views claim that it is a mistake to expect such an answer, just as some
intuitionists claim that it is a mistake to expect a true and informative answer to the
question of what makes it the case that we have the duties we have. Such views
seem coherent and worthy of discussion. Thus we should include them in our
typology of possible answers to the explanatory question.
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between the four categories of explanatory
theory we have distinguished.
4 Conclusion
We should abandon the tripartite classification and approach the philosophical topic
of welfare with many more than three categories in mind. We should distinguish
enumerative claims from explanatory claims, treating them for typological purposes
as independent kinds of issue (though explanatory theories must of course be
oriented to particular enumerations).
I have suggested that we should distinguish four categories of answer to each
question. Treating the two questions as independent, we should recognise at least
sixteen possible combinations of answers. This does not imply, of course, that there
are exactly sixteen good candidate combined theories of welfare. Some of the
possible combinations might be unappealing for various reasons. As I have
mentioned, it could also be that finer-grained distinctions between views occupying
the various categories I have specified are warranted in some cases. The sixteen
categories are supposed to establish bearings and prompt consideration of possible
combinations, not to replace detailed argument about the merits of particular theses.
The main point is twofold: first, we should be careful to respect Crisp’s
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distinction—even if we believe that certain combinations of explanatory and
enumerative view are incoherent; and second, we should think in terms of a much
richer range of possible theories of welfare than is suggested by the tripartite
classification.
Respecting Crisp’s distinction may help to make various kinds of hybrid view
seem more attractive. In particular, if we distinguish the explanatory and
enumerative questions clearly we may be more inclined to take seriously
enumerative theories that combine different requirements, such as the conjunctive
and disjunctive enumerative hybrids briefly discussed in Sect. 2. For example,
failure to distinguish the enumerative and explanatory questions can make it seem
that, insofar as we believe that some pleasures are constituents of welfare, we must
believe that all pleasures are, on pain of some kind of incoherence. But this is
plainly not true. All sorts of enumerative hedges, combinations, and restrictions are
possible. It of course remains a further question whether some satisfactory
According to the theory, is there a true informative answer to the
explanatory question? 
No Yes
No-answer theories 
Does the explanation refer only to the subject’s attitudes? 
No Yes
Subjective theories
Does the explanation refer to objective values? 
No Yes
Naturalist theories   Objective theories 
Fig. 1 Proposed classification of explanatory theories
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explanatory theory can be combined with the resulting enumerative theory—but the
main point is that this is, indeed, a further question.
To illustrate this point, consider Mill’s idea that higher quality pleasures have
greater value than lower quality pleasures. This idea has been accused of
incoherence or of abandoning hedonism (Mill 1991, pp. 138–139; Moore 1993,
pp. 129–132). The accusation is incorrect if we characterise hedonism as I did
above: qualitative hedonism endorses the experience requirement and identifies
pleasure as the relevant sort of experience, and so it is a hedonist view. It goes on to
specify the constituents of welfare using further distinctions, but there need be
nothing incoherent in an enumerative theory doing that. However, it is much less
clear that a satisfactory subjective explanatory theory could support these further
distinctions. Qualitative hedonists claim that higher quality pleasures have higher
value whether or not the subject agrees. It’s hard to see how this claim can be
explained, as subjectivists wish to do, entirely in terms of the subject’s attitudes.
So there may be a kind of incoherence here, but if so it lies in the combination of
qualitative hedonism with explanatory subjectivism. It could be that those who
allege that qualitative hedonism itself is incoherent have tacitly assumed that it must
be paired with a subjective explanatory theory. In fact, though, qualitative hedonism
is more naturally paired with an objective explanatory theory according to which
different qualities of pleasure make different contributions to welfare because
pleasures of these kinds have correspondingly different amounts of objective value.
As this illustrates, one helpful effect of respecting Crisp’s distinction is to refine
criticisms of proposed theories of welfare: the complaint that some hybrid proposal
is ‘incoherent’ should often be replaced by the complaint that it is explanatorily
incomplete or in some other way unsatisfactory. In this and other ways, dispensing
with the tripartite classification of theories of welfare may help us to make progress.
Acknowledgments I am grateful to Roger Crisp, Guy Fletcher, Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins, Daniel Nolan,
Neil Sinclair, Jonathan Tallant, and several anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts of this
paper.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
References
Bailey, J. W. (1997). Utilitarianism, institutions, and justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Brandt, R. B. (1979). A theory of the good and the right. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Carson, T. L. (2000). Value and the good life. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Crisp, R. (2006). Reasons and the good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Crisp, R. (2008). Well-Being. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/well-being. Accessed on September 12, 2011.
Darwall, S. (2002). Welfare and rational care. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Feldman, F. (1997). Two questions about pleasure. In F. Feldman (Ed.), Utilitarianism, hedonism, and
desert. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Feldman, F. (2004). Pleasure and the good life. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
802 C. Woodard
123
Feldman, F. (2010). What is this thing called happiness? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fletcher, G. (2008). Good for. PhD Thesis, University of Reading, UK.
Fletcher, G. (2009). Rejecting well-being invariabilism. Philosophical Papers, 38, 21–34.
Fletcher, G. (forthcoming). A fresh start for objective-list theories of well-being. Utilitas.
Foot, P. (2001). Natural goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Griffin, J. (1986). Well-being: Its meaning, measurement, and moral importance. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Hawkins, J. (2010). A new theory of well-being. Unpublished paper presented at the annual conference of
the British Society for Ethical Theory, University of Nottingham, 9th July 2010.
Haybron, D. M. (2008). The pursuit of unhappiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heathwood, C. (2006). Desire satisfactionism and hedonism. Philosophical Studies, 128, 539–563.
Heathwood, C. (2010). Welfare. In J. Skorupski (Ed.), The Routledge companion to ethics (pp. 645–655).
Abingdon: Routledge.
Kagan, S. (1998). Normative ethics. Boulder: Westview Press.
Kagan, S. (2009). Well-being as enjoying the good. Philosophical Perspectives, 23, 253–272.
Mill, J. S. (1991). Utilitarianism. In J. Gray (Ed.), On liberty and other essays. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Moore, G. E. (1993). Principia Ethica. In T. Baldwin (Ed.), revised edition. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Parfit, D. (1987). Reasons and persons, reprint with corrections. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Scanlon, T. M. (1993). Value, desire, and quality of life. In M. Nussbaum & A. Sen (Eds.), The quality of
life (pp. 185–200). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sumner, L. W. (1996). Welfare, happiness, and ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Classifying theories of welfare 803
123
